How the DAO Works
The Landshare DAO builds on our existing Snapshot governance protocol, allowing anyone who holds at least 100 LAND to create a new proposal at any time. Using the SafeSnap plugin, the governance proposal can directly change vault rewards, burning tokens, or altering the minting rate.
The DAO can be thought of as having 3 components, similar to separation of powers in a government:
- The Legislative Branch, which is Landshare Token holders who propose and vote using the Governance Protocol
- The Executive Branch, which is core team members who moderate proposals and veto those brought forth by malicious actors
- The Judicial Branch, which consists of Reality.eth and an arbitrator contract
In this comparison, the community acts as the legislative branch through the Governance Protocol. The existing Landshare governance protocol is how the community members can create new proposals which, if passed with a majority vote, can be executed autonomously.
The power of the Governance Protocol lies in the Treasury contract. The treasury is a multi-sig wallet that not only controls all the treasury funds allocated to the DAO, but also has direct and exclusive control over staking contracts and token minting. Transactions can only be executed by the treasury contract with a passing governance proposal.
Let’s try to simplify it with an example:
- 1.A member of the DAO wants to increase LAND staking rewards from 1600/day to 1700/day.
- 2.The user creates a proposal which is submitted to be voted on. This proposal is tied to the staking reward change transaction.
- 3.The proposal is voted on by the community and passes with a majority of the vote.
- 4.The outcome of the proposal vote is verified on-chain using Reality.eth (covered below)
- 5.The staking reward change can now be executed by any member of the DAO.
Voting power is based on one vote for each LAND. Your total voting power is determined by the sum of the following:
- Staked LAND in both Auto and standard vaults
- LAND in your wallet
- LAND and BNB in LP
Voting power derived from LAND in LP pairs also includes the BNB contribution. For example, if you hold 100 LAND paired with BNB in LP Tokens, your voting power would be 200.
Landshare’s core team act as the Executive Branch, which has to power to veto malicious proposals. Administrators are not able to unilaterally execute proposals through the treasury but can reject them at their discretion.
The administrators also have other authorities delegated by default, such as the ability to manage and conduct the marketing bounties approved by the DAO. The Governance Protocol is able to vote to remove the administrators’ power entirely, if there is a desire to do so.
The Landshare DAO will utilize Reality.eth, which acts as a decentralized oracle for the outcome of proposals. This is necessary because the Snapshot votes occur off-chain, and contract interactions occur on-chain. Reality.eth acts as a decentralized oracle that resolves an off-chain vote on chain. For more information on how Reality.eth works, check out their documents here.
If the Reality.eth module fails to produce the correct outcome of the proposal, anybody can request arbitration. During this process, the core team will become the arbiter of the proposal’s outcome. While we generally do not believe disputes will get to this step, the ability to arbitrate is a failsafe that ensures the outcome of proposals will always resolve correctly.
If the DAO so chooses, the arbitration authority can be transferred to a decentralized model or removed entirely.
Creating, voting on, and executing a proposal will generally take 6-8 days from proposal to execution. The process is broken down as follows:
The voting period is set to 5 days by default, but in some cases proposals may only have a 3-day voting period. This is the time in which LAND holders can vote on proposals in snapshot. The voting period can be changed via DAO vote.
The duration that answers can be submitted to the Reality.eth oracle (resets when a new answer is submitted). The process may be expedited in some cases by requesting administrative arbitration.
This is the delay between when a proposal complete arbitration and when they can be executed. This day is a failsafe that allows the administrators to veto malicious proposals if they managed to pass through the arbitration process.